alfred ledger — verify Proof Receipts

Every alfred run leaves a signed, hash-chained ledger (the Proof Receipt, ADR 0001 §5.3 + ADR 0004) under .alfred/workflows/<runId>/ledger.jsonl. alfred ledger verify recomputes the whole chain and exits non-zero on the first broken row — one command to answer "is this receipt genuine?"

alfred ledger verify          # verify the latest run under .alfred/workflows
alfred ledger verify <path>   # verify a specific ledger.jsonl
alfred ledger show            # render the rows as a table, then verify
alfred ledger show --md       # Markdown table — paste into a PR description

What is checked

Check	Catches
HMAC-SHA-256 signature per row (ALFRED_LEDGER_SECRET)	Any edit to a row's payload
prevSig hash chain	Reordered, inserted or deleted rows
seq continuity	Dropped rows mid-chain
Signed head anchor (ledger.jsonl.head)	Tail truncation — a prefix of a valid chain is itself valid, so the chain alone cannot catch it; the anchor signs (count, lastSig)

Rows are redacted before signing (ADR 0003), so a receipt is safe to share — verification never requires the secrets that appeared in tool output.

Exit codes

Code	Meaning
0	Chain + head anchor verified
1	No ledger found / bad invocation
2	Tamper detected (verify and show)

Example session

$ alfred ledger verify
✓ ledger intact — 2 rows, hash chain + head anchor verified
  .alfred/workflows/2026-06-11T02-57-18-825Z/ledger.jsonl

$ sed -i '' 's/"passing"/"PASSING"/' .alfred/workflows/*/ledger.jsonl   # flip one byte

$ alfred ledger verify
✗ TAMPER DETECTED at row 0: Signature mismatch at seq 0
  .alfred/workflows/2026-06-11T02-57-18-825Z/ledger.jsonl
$ echo $?
1

CI usage

Gate a pipeline on receipt integrity after an autonomous run:

- run: alfred run --verify "bun test" --max-features 5
  env:
    ALFRED_LEDGER_SECRET: ${{ secrets.ALFRED_LEDGER_SECRET }}
- run: alfred ledger verify
  env:
    ALFRED_LEDGER_SECRET: ${{ secrets.ALFRED_LEDGER_SECRET }}

The same secret must be supplied at verify time — signatures are HMAC, not public-key: whoever holds the secret can both sign and verify. Keep it in your CI secret store, not in the repo.

See also

• alfred run — the harness that writes the ledger
• Try it offline — bun run demo drives a real run with a scripted model (no API key), then tampers with the receipt